Recent funding cuts to CISA and uncertainty around ownership of the CVE database have sent waves of concern throughout the cybersecurity community. These developments underscore the fragility of resources crucial to global cybersecurity. Although they appear bureaucratic or administrative, the implications are profound and far-reaching, impacting not only U.S. cybersecurity but the global digital landscape.

The vital role of CISA, CVE, and emerging international efforts

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is more than just a U.S. agency—it’s a driving force behind global cybersecurity efforts. Its threat intelligence, advisories, and Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog are indispensable to the work of security teams worldwide. When CISA’s capabilities are compromised by budget cuts or staffing shortages, the global cybersecurity posture weakens. CISA’s standards and best practices guide international responses, making its strength integral to global cybersecurity resilience.

Similarly, the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database functions as a universal Rosetta Stone in vulnerability management. Virtually all security tools, threat intelligence, and patch management processes rely on CVE identifiers. If this database were to lose stability or authority, fragmentation could ensue. It’s no exaggeration to say this would complicate risk management for CISOs, coordination for vendors, and effective vulnerability reporting by researchers. Recent vulnerabilities in CVE governance highlight the dangers of entrusting crucial global assets solely to a single nation’s fluctuating political and funding cycles.

In anticipation of such governance issues, the CVE Foundation was established nearly a year ago. This entity aims to provide more stable, international, and community-driven oversight, addressing the fragility inherent in previous governance models.

Further responding to these concerns, the European Union, via ENISA, launched the European Vulnerability Database (euVD) on May 12th. This was mandated explicitly by the NIS2 Directive. The euVD seeks to provide an EU-centric repository, potentially reducing dependence on the U.S.-controlled CVE database. While this move toward decentralization addresses certain vulnerabilities, it introduces potential risks around database conflicts, reminiscent of issues seen with inconsistent threat actor naming conventions. Harmonization of these datasets across different platforms will therefore be crucial to ensure complementary rather than conflicting approaches, maintaining clarity for defenders worldwide.

How did we reach this point?

Since its inception, the CVE program has consistently been underfunded and vulnerable to shifting government priorities. Recent U.S. budget uncertainties starkly revealed the risk of binding a critical global resource to a single government’s internal politics. This underscores the need to redefine these resources as global public goods, supported by international funding and governance structures reflective of their worldwide significance.

This sentiment resonates deeply throughout the global community, particularly among professionals who view vulnerability management infrastructure as global critical infrastructure that must remain resilient irrespective of political dynamics. As one cybersecurity expert observed, the ability to have a consistent, universally recognized master key for vulnerabilities is essential for clarity and effectiveness during critical moments. The current fragility of CVE funding and governance clearly underscores the need for a more robust, globally resilient solution.

Immediate impact and future risks

CISA’s staffing cuts have already begun eroding its capacity, causing the loss of vital institutional knowledge and proactive attrition. This directly undermines incident response coordination, critical infrastructure programs, and community support. Continued weakening of federal capabilities may push greater responsibility onto the private sector and state-level agencies, redefining the federal role to addressing only the most critical infrastructure issues.

As an Australian living in the United States, I can see both sides. Ultimately, I consider a master key on vulnerabilities to be global critical infrastructure. When it matters, this resource is a critical reference. Global critical infrastructure needs to be resilient, and a solution that isn’t subject to the fragility of funding and the general unpredictability of current U.S. governance is clearly needed.

My main concern is vulnerability conflicts across databases, which are reminiscent of how threat actor naming can cause confusion (i.e., times when clarity is critical). It is vital to clearly distinguish the core task of maintaining a unified identifier system for vulnerabilities from the “data decoration” practices seen in databases like NVD. “Decorating” data without ensuring its accuracy only leads to dirty data, complicating efforts further. A fundamental challenge ahead is ensuring that the defender ecosystem is universally discussing the same thing when referring to a particular vulnerability. While decentralization is clearly needed for resilience, harmonization of the dataset across different platforms remains equally important. 

Moving forward: An international response

Should CISA’s capabilities continue to diminish, international equivalents such as the UK’s NCSC, Australia’s ACSC, and the newly launched euVD by ENISA must step up, increasing their roles in vulnerability coordination and threat intelligence sharing. This shift could encourage deeper international collaboration, joint cybersecurity advisories, and potentially a more federated vulnerability management model. The priority must remain clear: prevent global cybersecurity fragmentation and enhance collective resilience.

In cybersecurity, there doesn’t seem to be any shortage of wake-up calls these days, but the turmoil around CISA and the CVE program serves as another critical moment in our history. Cybersecurity resources essential for global digital safety cannot remain vulnerable to political volatility and inconsistent funding. While moves toward a foundation-based CVE model, spearheaded by efforts like the CVE Foundation, and initiatives like euVD are promising, securing global buy-in from governments, industry, and the security research community is essential.

Now is the time for reflection and decisive action. Ensuring the resilience, stable funding, and globally representative governance of critical cybersecurity infrastructure is a necessity—not just an ideal. Anything less is a risk the global community simply cannot afford to take.